Fixed-Term Contracts and the Duration Distribution of Unemployment

In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts. Since then their labor markets have become more dynamic. This paper studies the implications of such reforms for the duration distribution of unemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the duration dependence. I estimate a parametric duration model using cross-sectional data drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1980 to 1994 to analyze the chances of leaving unemployment before and after the introduction of fixed-term contracts. I find that duration dependence has increased since such reform. Semi-parametric estimation of the model also shows that for long spells, the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased since such reform.cross-sectional data, duration model, turnover

Fixed-term contracts and the duration distribution of unemployment

In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts. Since then their labor markets have become more dynamic. This paper studies the implications of such reforms for the duration distribution of unemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the duration dependence. I estimate a parametric duration model using cross-sectional data drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1980 to 1994 to analyze the chances of leaving unemployment before and after the introduction of fixed-term contracts. I find that duration dependence has increased since such reform. Semi-parametric estimation of the model also shows that for long spells, the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased since such reform.Cross-sectional data, duration model, turnover

Employment Protection and Unemployment in an Efficiency Wage Model

Firing costs are often blamed for unemployment. This paper investigates this well spread belief. The main points are two. First, firing costs are modelled in an efficiency wage model to capture their effects on employment through wages. Secondly, dismissal conflicts are modelled explicitly. In the context of imperfectly observable effort, a double moral hazard problem can arise and in turn firing costs reduced employment because they increase the rent to be paid to workers. The determinants of the double moral hazard problem such as the imprecise definition of dismissal causes are analysed. The main policy conclusion is that focus should move onto the clarification of the different causes of dismissal to minimise the room of interpretation. If so, then high enough severance payments in case of 'unfair' dismissals can actually have a punishment role and prevent the double moral hazard problem.Firing costs, efficiency wages, "unfair" dismissal

How binding are legal limits? Transitions from temporary to permanent work in Spain

This paper studies the duration pattern of …xed-term contracts and the determinants of their conversion into permanent ones in Spain, where the share of …xed-term employment is the highest in Europe. We estimate a duration model for temporary employment, with competing risks of terminating into permanent employment versus alternative states, and ‡exible duration dependence. We …nd that conversion rates are generally below 10%. Our estimated conversion rates roughly increase with tenure, with a pronounced spike at the legal limit, when there is no legal way to retain the worker on a temporary contract. We argue that estimated di¤erences in conversion rates across categories of workers can stem from di¤erences in worker outside options and thus the power to credibly threat to quit temporary jobs.Fixed-term contracts, duration models

Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-section data

We propose a new econometric estimation method for analyzing the probability of leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-section data, which can be especially useful when panel data are not available. The proposed method-of-moments-based estimator has two important features: (1) it estimates the exit probability at the individual level and (2) it does not rely on the stationarity assumption of the inflow composition. We illustrate and gauge the performance of the proposed estimator using the Spanish Labor Force Survey data, and analyze the changes in distribution of unemployment between the 1980s and 1990s during a period of labor market reform. We find that the relative probability of leaving unemployment of the short-term unemployed versus the long-term unemployed becomes significantly higher in the 1990s.Repeated cross-section data. GMM, duration analysis, unemployment

Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates in OECD Countries

There is an enormous literature on gender gaps in pay and labour market participation but virtually noliterature on gender gaps in unemployment rates. Although there are some countries in which there isessentially no gender gap in unemployment, there are others in which the female unemployment rate issubstantially above the male. Although it is easy to give plausible reasons for why more women than menmay decide not to want work, it is not so obvious why, once they have decided they want a job, women insome countries are less likely to be in employment than men. This is the subject of this paper. We showthat, in countries where there is a large gender gap in unemployment rates, there is a gender gap in bothflows from employment into unemployment and from unemployment into employment. We investigatedifferent hypotheses about the sources of these gaps. Most hypotheses find little support in the data and thegender gap in unemployment rates (like the gender gap in pay) remains largely unexplained. But it doesseem to correlate with attitudes on whether men are more deserving of work than women so thatdiscrimination against women may explain part of the gender gap in unemployment rates in theMediterranean countries.Gender Gap, Unemployment Rates

Fixed-Term Contracts and Unemployment: An Efficiency Wage Analysis

During the 1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts to fight high and persistent levels of unemployment. Although these contracts have been widely used, unemployment has remained about the same after fifteen years. This paper builds a theoretical model to reconcile these facts. We analyse the labour market effect of the introduction of fixed-term contracts and the firm's choice of contracts are studied. Permanent contracts are the standard way to offer incentives, but fixed-term contracts are cheaper. This generates an externality, which can make employment higher in the system with only permanent contracts. As a consequence, from a social point of view, the share of fixed-term contracts is too large. Increases in the renewal rate of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts lead to higher employment levels. Finally, the model highlights the interactions between different rigidities in the labour market. Aggregate employment and the share of temporary contracts are affected in the same way by the firing costs and the flexibility of wages.Unemployment, firing costs, two-tier system, permanent contracts, fixed-term contracts

Intergenerational Mobility and the Informative Content of Surnames

We propose an alternative method for measuring intergenerational mobility. Traditional methods based on panel data provide measurements that are scarce, difficult to compare across countries and almost impossible to get across time. In particular this means that we do not know how intergenerational mobility is correlated with growth, income or the degree of inequality. Our proposal is to measure the informative content of surnames in one census. The more information does the surname have on the income of an individual, the more important is background in determining outcomes; and thus, the less mobility there is. The reason for this is that surnames inform on family relationships because the distribution of surnames is necessarily much skewed. A large percentage of the population is bound to have a very unfrequent surname. For them the partition generated by surnames is very informative on family linkages. First, we develop a model whose endogenous variable is the joint distribution of surnames and income. Then we explore the relationship between mobility and the informative content of surnames. We allow for assortative mating to be a determinant of both. Then, we use our methodology to show that in a large Spanish region the informative content of surnames is large and consistent with the model. We also show that it has increased over time, indicating a substantial drop in the degree of mobility. Finally, using the peculiarities of the Spanish surname convention we show that the degree of assortative mating has also increased over time, in such a manner that might explain the decrease in mobility observed. Our method allows us to provide measures of mobility comparable across time. It should also allow us to study other issues related to inheritance.inheritance, birth-death processes, cross-sectional data, population genetics

Is Seniority-Based Pay Used as a Motivation Device? Evidence from Plant Level Data

In this paper we use data from industrial plants to investigate if seniority-based pay is used asa motivational device for production workers. Alternatively, seniority-based pay could simplybe a wage setting rule not necessarily related to the provision of incentives. Unlike previouspapers, we use a direct measure of seniority-based pay as well as measures of monitoringdevices and piece-rates. We find that firms that offer seniority-based pay are less likely tooffer explicit incentives. They are also less likely to invest in monitoring devices. We alsofind that firms that offer seniority-based pay are more likely to engage in other humanresource management policies that result in long employment relationships. Overall theseresults suggest that seniority-based pay is indeed used as a motivation device.Human resource management practices, incentives, monitoring

The transition of workers from temporary to permanent employment: The Spanish case

Since fixed-term contracts were introduced in Spain, 98% of all new contracts have been of this type. Despite this massive flexibilisation of the labour market, Spanish unemployment still hits more than 20% of the labour force. To assess the effects of the introduction of fixed-term contracts on the labour market it is important to understand the dynamics of the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones. To address this issue we estimate a duration model for temporary employment, with competing risks of flowing into permanent employment versus non-employment, and flexible duration dependence. Preliminary results show that the probability of obtaining the renewal of a fixed-term contract on a permanent basis is not affected by the state of the business cycle. At the same time, the base-line hazard for renewals has a spike at three years of duration, coinciding with the legal limit of fixed-term contracts